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Political aspect.
Hartono's premature death, which is the primary focus of this website, seems to have been politically
beneficial for the regime in power.
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He was aware of f the situation surrounding the original text of the Supersemar
document (original not available) reportedly transferring power to Suharto and following letter of Sukarno
reprimanding Suharto that he acted out of bounds.
" The original text of the socalled Supersemar letter is reportedly lost.
Suharto has contended that with this letter Sukarno transferred power to him. One of his actions was then to abolish
the PKI.
On 13 March 1965 President Sukarno sent Suharto another letter reminding him that he had
overstepped his duties.
This letter was handed to Suharto by Dr. Jo Leimena and (then) Brig) General KKO Hartono.
They reported to Sukarno that they had delivered the letter and that Suharto's reply was:
"Tell President Sukarno that I assume responsibility for my actions.
Also, I will not be able to come to him in Bogor as I have a meeting with the military
"
(Source: Hanafi Menggugat, Kesaksian wakil komandan Tjakrabirawa Maulwi Saelan
- Dari revolusi 45 sampai kudeta 66).
This indicates that the Supersemar letter did not constitute a transfer of power by Sukarno to Suharto. It indicates
a coup by Suharto, taking over presidential powers by false statements. The disappearance of the Supersemar letter
tends to substantiate the contention that it did not transfer power to Suharto as claimed.
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He was part of the Sukarno Navy leadership supporting the Maritime View hindering the new government's efforts
to comply with the wishes of the US and its allies to have control of strategic Indonesian
waterways.
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Mid December 1970 Hartono went to Tokyo to attend a meeting of Indonesian Ambassadors in Asia. He traveled via
Moscow as no
direct flight Pyongyang - Tokyo was available. In Moscow he had a long discussion with Ambassador Muljadi. Topic
of the discussion
was Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Sudomo's removal from their command positions of a number of senior Navy officers.
He informed Muljadi that in Tokyo he planned to ask permission from Foreign Minister Adam Malik to travel to Jakarta
and meet
Admiral Sudomo to discuss the subject. When traveling to Jakarta he sent his adjutant Krisna Rubowo back to Pyongyang
to stay
with the family. On the way to Jakarta he had a meeting in Bangkok with Ambassador H.R.
Dharsono.
(Note - General Dharsono fell into President's Suharto's disgrace in 1978 when he became one of the Petisi
50 (Petition of 50) group of civilian and military Indonesian leaders petitioning for greater political freedom.
The Petition of Fifty was a political document protesting President Suharto's use of the
Pancasila state philosophy against political opponents. It was an important expression of civilian and military
opposition against the alleged presidential misuse of the Pancasila to threaten political enemies.
The 50 petitioners afterward encountered difficulties in their social, economic and business activities. They were
removed from
government positions, their bank accounts were frozen and they were not allowed to leave the country, their movements
controlled.
Ali Sadikin was one of the 50 petitioners).
In Jakarta he had several meetings with top level officials of the Foreign Ministry,
Navy, BAKIN (Intelligence Board) and Ministry of Defense (Hankam).
He attended the New Years reception of President Suharto.
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His itinerary in Jakarta included highlevel visits to
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Foreign Minister Adam Malik
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Naval Headquarters, Admiral Sudomo, Vice Admiral Subono
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General Ali Murtopo - Presidential Personal Assistant
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Maj General Sutopo Juwono, BAKIN - State Intelligence Agency
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Military Police Directorate
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Lt General Sumitro Wapangkopkamtib - Deputy Chief Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order
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Maj General Darjatmo Hankam -Ministry of Defense
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Maj General Yoga Sugama, BAKIN - State Intelligence Agency
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General Panggabean, Pangkopkamtib - Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order
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President Suharto, 4 January at his residence in Jln Cendana.
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KKO Headquarters
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He was booked for return to Pyongyang on 6 January 1971.
On the eve of his departure he paid a courtesy visit to Gerard Rampen, uncle of Grace, whom he considered as his
father-in-law
(Grace's father Dr. Ples Walandouw had died at an early age in 1937, her mother died in 1956).
He did not show any symptoms that he contemplated suicide. He announced his next day return to North Korea and
showed
his eagerness to return to his family after an extended absence of nearly a month.
The rest of the evening he spent with his brothers and family at his home at Jl. Prof. Dr. Supomo.
In the early morning on the day of his scheduled departure January 6, he reportedly received 2 visitors.
Shortly afterward he was found dead in his bedroom.
His death was called a suicide although the circumstancess do not support this. There were bullet holes in the
room. If it was a suicide why shoot at other targets like the wardrobe. No shots were heard in the dark and quit
stillness of the home where only his mother lived. This indicated that a silencer may have been used, raising the
question: Why use a silencer if attempting suicide?
The mother may have heard a falling sound but not gunshots.
He was taken away for an autopsy at RSPAD, the Army Hospital, instead of the Naval Hospital, the logical place
to be brought for a
Navy officer. His family was barred from attending the preparation of the body for burial, and was only allowed
to view the body after preparations had been completed, his head heavily swathed in bandages.
The home was searched by military police and his briefcase and documents were confiscated. Even music cassettes
with children songs he bought for his daughters were taken away. Was there fear that he might have taped something
on those cassettes? What documents were taken? It can be assumed that Hartono had made notes of the results of
all his visits in Jakarta. But no documents were found at home.
No death certificate stating cause of death has been made available to the family.
The day after arrival of Grace and family from Pyongyang, Admiral Sudomo accompanied by KKO Commander Major General
Mukyat
paid a visit. Admiral Sudomo told Grace that his investigations had established that Hartono had committed suicide.
Major General Mukyat' s comment only was :
"Saya hanya macan tak bergigi (I am just a toothless
tiger)",
indicating that he was helpless and could not do or say anything.
After Hartono's death Grace encountered a very difficult period. Hartono was the sole
provider. With him gone, there was no income.
With no death certificate made available in spite of various requests, it took a long time before money in his
bank account was released.
Grace and her 4 daughters ultimately had to leave the house at Jl. Dr. Prof Supomo 44. They were paying off the
house that they were allowed to buy. Hartono had told her that he had already paid more than half of the price.
With all his documents confiscated however, Grace is not able to substantiate the claim. Perhaps somebody can help
her in this myriad of loopholes.
Falling into deeper financial trouble each year, she finally ended up in a small rented one-bedroom house in
Pamulang where
she lived with 3 daughters and 2 grandsons.
Ret. Lt. General KKO Ali Sadikin, a good friend and colleague of Hartono, helped as much as he could, also helping
with rental
payments. Grace suffered deeply in those years, left alone with 4 daughters, Chandra the oldest 10 years, Nuryani
the youngest
6 years at the time of Hartono's death. The sufferings show in her deeply lined face as depicted in her current
pictures.
Her children encountered difficulties in trying to build a career and were not able to escape the low-paying jobs
environment.
However, Allessandro, one of the grandsons, does not succumb to desperation.
He proudly proclaims that he will join the Marines like his grandfather.
Grace remains firm in her conviction that Hartono did not commit suicide.
In this she is supported by her family, Hartono's colleagues and friends.
She continues her quest to have her husband's name cleared from the stigma attached to it by the government.
There are so many unanswered questions. The ALRI has never been able to come up with acceptable answers. Sudomo
insists that it
is suicide. Ali Sadikin, Kahpi Suriodiredjo and others have told Grace that they were told by competent sources
that Hartono was murdered.
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REKAYASA SEJARAH TENTANG SUPERSEMAR
?
Oleh Asvi Warman Adam
Setelah dikeluarkan 39 tahun silam, tidak banyak yang baru mengenai Supersemar (Surat Perintah 11 Maret) 1966.
Naskah aslinya belum ditemukan, entah siapa yang menyembunyikan meskipun orang tentu dapat menduga-duga. Walaupun
ada beberapa versi yang satu lain sedikit berbeda di Arsip Nasional RI, dapat disimpulkan bahwa Soeharto telah
melampaui kewenangan yang diberikan dalam surat perintah itu. Apalagi dalam pidato Bung Karno antara 1965-1967
yang baru bisa terbit setelah tahun 1998, ditandaskan bahwa Supersemar itu bukan “transfert of authority”.
Yang menjadi persoalan di luar dokumen itu sendiri adalah cara mendapatkannya atau suasana sebelum surat perintah
itu diberikan. Dua tahun yang lalu, seorang mantan KKO, Letnan Soejono (kini 63 tahun, sekjen sebuah LSM)) mengatakan
bahwa ia mengawal rombongan Presiden Soekarno tanggal 10 Maret 1966 tengah malam dan mengantarkan sampai di Istana
Bogor dinihari tanggal 11 Maret. Ia juga mengatakan tidak mungkin Soekarno berada di Jakarta tanggal 11 Maret 1966
dari pagi sampai siang.
Alasannya karena rombongan Presiden yang terdiri dari 5 sedan itu baru sampai di Istana Bogor pukul 04 pagi tanggal
11 Maret 1966. Menurut Soejono, Soekarno sampai di markas Cilandak pukul 23 malam, istirahat sampai pukul 01 dinihari
dan lalu minta diantarkan ke Bogor. Yang mengawal ke sana selain Soejono adalah mayor Pirngadie dan 4 prajurit
KKO yang diperlengkapi dengan senjata mitraliur ringan buatan Uni Soviet. Rombongan bergerak di bawah hujan rintik
menyusuri jalan tanah berlumpur bahkan banyak yang berlubang bagaikan kubangan (Kompas, 13 Maret 2003).
Kesaksian Soejono ini perlu diperiksa kebenarannya. Pertama, kenyataan Soekarno memimpin sidang kabinet di Jakarta
pada tanggal 11 Maret 1996 dan kemudian berangkat dengan tergesa-gesa ke Istana Bogor adalah suatu peristiwa sejarah
yang telah terterima (accepted history) dan tidak usah diragukan lagi. Kedua, apakah Soekarno dan rombongan mengunjungi
markas KKO di Cilandak ? Mungkin saja itu terjadi. Tetapi menurut hemat saya tidak tepat kalau Soejono mengatakan
bahwa Presiden Soekarno yang merasa tertekan meminta perlindungan ke markas KKO. Soekarno bukanlah tokoh semacam
itu. Seandainya Bung Karno melakukan inspeksi mendadak ke Cilandak dan kemudian beberapa perwira KKO menawarkan
pengawalan tambahan -mengingat situasi waktu itu yang kian genting-itu sesuatu hal yang masuk akal. Tetapi sekali
lagi, tanggalnya bisa 10 Maret 1966 atau barangkali pada tanggal yang lain.
Kenapa tanggal 10 Maret 1966 muncul dalam wacana yang disampaikan oleh seorang saksi ? Perkiraan saya itu berasal
dari keterangan ajudan Bung Karno, Bambang Widjanarko ketika diperiksa TPP (Team Pemeriksa Pusat) Kopkamtib (Komando
Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban) akhir tahun 1970. Hasil pemeriksaan itu dibukukan dalam dua bahasa (Indonesia-Inggris)
oleh Antonie C.A.Dake April 1974 berjudul The Devious Dalang: Sukarno and the so called Untung putsch. Eye-witness
report by Bambang S.Widjanarko (diedit oleh Rahadi S.Karni dan diterbitkan Interdog Publishing House, Denhaag).
Buku yang menuduh keterlibatan Soekarno dalam G30S itu dilarang di Indonesia karena dikuatirkan menimbulkan kemarahan
para pendukung mantan Presiden. Belakangan Widjanarko sendiri yang berasal dari KKO mengakui bahwa ia dipaksa untuk
memberikan pengakuan demikian.
Sejak halaman awal buku itu telah mencari-cari kesalahan Bung Karno. Pertanyaan yang pertama diajukan adalah tentang
informasi yang diperoleh Sabur tanggal 10 Maret 1966 pukul 18.30 bahwa ada pasukan yang akan menyerbu Istana. Pukul
19 Kombes Sumirat menyampaikan surat kepada Presiden. Anehnya surat itu ditulis dalam bahasa Jawa, Widjanarko diminta
menerjemahkan. Isinya pasukan Kostrad akan menyerbu, surat itu ditandangani oleh Jenderal Suadi (Angkatan darat).
Ketika itu beberapa Menteri telah berada di istana karena diminta oleh Soekarno menginap di sana demi keamanan.
Karena surat ancaman itu, maka Presiden Soekarno dan rombongan pergi ke Istana Bogor dengan
melewati markas KKO Cilandak. Di sini Soekarno sempat berbicara dengan komandan KKO Jenderal Hartono pukul 24 malam
sampai 02 dini hari. Demikian keterangan yang tercantum dalam buku The Devious Dalang (hal 3-8) yang kiranya mengilhami
kisah Soejono yang dituturkan dua tahun yang lalu.
Informasi Soejono mengenai kejadian tanggal 10-11 Maret 1966 masih diragukan. Sementara itu buku karangan Dake,
The Devious Dalang lebih banyak merupakan hasil rekayasa aparat keamanan Orde Baru, hasil interogasi yang dipaksakan.
Kemudian, sebagai kesatuan yang loyal kepada Presiden Soekarno, KKO sendiri dirugikan
nama baiknya oleh rezim penguasa dengan mengarang cerita bahwa mantan komandannya, Jenderal Hartono, meninggal
karena bunuh diri.
ejarah perlu ditulis kembali dan bagian yang bengkok mesti diluruskan serta nama baik
tokoh yang pernah dirusak perlu direhabilitasi kembali.
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