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The Top Maritime Commanders in the 1960's
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Color-Coded World Map
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After Suharto replaced Sukarno as
president relations with the US improved
tremendously and US investment grew as never before.
Trade routes thru Indonesian waterways were opened, the 7th Fleet had undisputed use of
thoroughfares thru Indonesian waterways from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean.
Vital maritime passage between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean
had been secured for both military and commercial purposes.
INDONESIA
INDONESIA WATERWAYS
Waterways - World
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Strategic Importance
The basic premise for any approach to Indonesia and strategy was the strategic importance
of the Indonesian-controlled areas. The population was at the time the world’s fifth largest, and the location
forced all major trade routes between The Far East and points west to pass through or near Indonesian territory.
The wealth of natural resources was enormous, and included critical raw materials like oil, tin and rubber.
The threats to Western interests from a communist Indonesia were estimated a bit
differently by the staffs and persons involved, although generally as serious. A comparatively mild judgment was
the one of Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council (NSC) staff. In a memorandum on US interests with
respect to West New Guinea, Robert Johnson stated that "[...] the loss of Indonesia could be as significant
as the loss of mainland Southeast Asia [...]"
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) went further in a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on US strategic
interest in Indonesia.6 Not only would communist military bases in Java and Sumatra outflank all the SEATO nations
as well as The US strategic military position in Southeast Asia, it would also "clearly isolate Australia
and New Zealand, serve as a communist launching area for covert and overt operations against the Philippines, and
deny the Free World countries the tremendous oil, tin and rubber resources which the United States seeks to deny
the communists." The psychological impact of such a communist victory would further "have a major effect
on the Free World military forces of Asia and their continued alignment with the United States." The Chiefs
feared that a chain reaction would follow, culminating in an eventual relinquishment of all principal US bases
in the Far East.
On the other hand, a more friendly Indonesia would "significantly enhance the US
military position in Asia." Indonesia could be expected to exert a commanding influence on all the other non-communist
Asian states, the Chiefs continued, and accordingly the matter of Indonesian alignment should be referred to the
National Security Council on a priority basis, and a major effort to salvage Indonesia from communism was of "utmost
national urgency" for the Unites States, concluded the Chiefs. McNamara used only days to concur in the assessments
and conclusion, and assured the Chiefs that he would take actions according to the estimated importance.
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The most dramatic assessment came from the Commander in Chief of the Pacific (CINCPAC),
Admiral Harry Felt during a 1962 Senate hearing.8 With the basis that the Indonesian
archipelago sat squarely on the major trade routes between the United States, Northern Pacific and the Near East,
Admiral Felt argued that whoever controlled the archipelago, controlled the entrance to the Indian Ocean from the
Pacific. "Simple geography" would make the fall of Indonesia into communist
hands nothing less than "a catastrophe to the free world":
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Australia and New Zealand would be isolated, even directly
threatened along with the Philippines. The almost inevitable effect would be the soon fall of the rest of neutral
Southeast Asia to communism. United States influence in all Southeast Asia would be "menaced". The fall
of the "Rice Bowl," as Congress colloquially called Southeast Asia, would in turn have dangerous effects
on the rest of Asia. In particular, India would probably
be a cause of great concern, since it was dependent on food from the area.
One should notice the different interests and circumstances involved in presenting the assessments. The Joint
Chiefs expressed clear concern, with general Lemnitzer and CINCPAC in Hawaii as the most visible protagonists for
Indonesia’s military importance and current volatility. The general political milieu in Washington DC, however,
acted ignorant or indifferent to this part of the world. Laos and Viet Nam were better known, but the impression
of Indonesia was "of just another of the Balkanlike countries of Southeast Asia blowing its big trumpet."
A reflection of this ignorance was the brief argument of importance included in many of the statements,
memos and notes concerning Indonesia. In hindsight, the general impression is that there was a constant
need of both imprinting the importance of Indonesia to external readers, as well as reassuring those who already
were concerned that their concern was real. In the jargon used by the Joint Chiefs, a military assessment reflecting
their deep concern, but not more than that, may thus have ended up as the catastrophe-scenarios they actually presented
of an emergent communist Indonesia. The almost eschatological phrases used on Indonesia mimicked those used to
describe Southeast Asian importance in general, adding to the mingling of the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asian
strategic concerns. Likewise, the Chiefs, wittingly or not, may have felt a need to justify their growing involvement
in Southeast Asia. To the non-distinguishing audience among the general public and Congress, Indonesia could not
then be estimated much lower in importance than mainland Southeast Asia.
he strategic assessments of Indonesia were all set in the context of Southeast Asia
and the Southwest Pacific in general. There is little doubt that the fate of the different countries in the two
areas were deemed by both the Chiefs and others as closely intertwined. A recurring concern, expressed among others
by The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Robert Johnson of the NSC staff, was the fear of being outflanked in Viet Nam
by a hostile Indonesia. Actions take in one area would seriously affect the other, the Chiefs concluded in October
1961, and any decisions to prevent communist expansion thus should be considered in this light. Because of the
close strategic connections made between these areas by all parties, the importance attached to Indonesia
did not lessen the importance of mainland Southeast Asia. In view of this connection, the Chiefs’ strategic concerns
regarding Indonesia is probably most correctly interpreted as practically the same as regarding Indochina.
The impression of the American Ambassador in Djakarta was that Washington maintained two scenarios for possible
communist expansion in the area: The first scenario was in line with the "well-known domino theory."
In Ambassador Jones’ interpretation, the domino theory implied that if Viet Nam fell to communism, the neighboring
countries would follow in line, with Thailand as the first major country likely to fall. The theory had a wide
range of supporters, and in Indonesian matters the theory is most visible in assessments from the Joint Chiefs.
The theory’s most prominent opponent was the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk.
The second scenario was best called the leap frog theory. It implied that the communists
would concentrate their next efforts on Indonesia, leap-frogging over mainland Southeast Asia, and thus catching
the rest of Southeast Asia "in a pincers" between communist China and Indonesia. Then there would only
be a matter of time before the entire area
would become communist.12
The different scenarios had in common that the fate of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific were intertwined.
However, in Washington many tended to treat the two enormous areas as a single unity rather than as connected,
but very different and complex singular countries. Particularly did Congress tend to treat countries as well as
larger regions somewhat arbitrarily. When a little known country like Indonesia came up, the Congressmen as well
as representatives of the administration would also tend to shift the debate to a country or region they knew more
about. A June 1961 debate on "International development and security" during the aid hearings in the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee illustrates the tendency,
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RI rejects
any effort to internationalize Malacca Strait.
Thursday, 30 August 2007
Indonesia will reject any effort to make the Malacca Strait problem an international issue because internationalization
would open an opportunity for foreign forces` involvement in securing the busiest waterway in the Asia Pacific,
Minister/State Secretary Hatta Radjasa said here on Wednesday.
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Radjasa who was here as a special emissary of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono at the funeral of former Japanese
prime minister Kiichi Miyazawa said on Tuesday, Indonesia`s stance on the matter was clear, namely the security
of the strait was in the hands of Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia as the littoral countries.
"The Malacca Strait comes under the territorial sovereignty of Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. Countries
outside them are mere users of the strait so they have no right to be involved in safeguarding it by deploying
their forces there," he said.
Indonesia had always reiterated its stance because it still saw efforts by certain quarters to internationalize
the matter to enable foreign forces to get involved in securing the strait.
It was enough for user countries to contribute through cooperation to increase the littoral states` security maintenance
capability.
Hatta said user countries could contribute by providing patrol vessels or technology to increase the three countries`
capability in securing the strait. "Let the joint patrols be carried out by the littoral countries,"
he added.
The minister noted the three countries had already agreed to divide the strait into three marine and air patrol
areas with each of them assuming responsibility for security in one area.
Japan was already aware of Indonesia`s sensitivity in the matter but also considered it important to see the matter
in a wider context.
Japan`s foreign ministry spokesman Mitsuo Sakaba told ANTARA recently Japan admitted the important role of Indonesia
in securing the waterway.
"However, problems like piracy, arms smuggling and others could also disrupt regional economic growth so that
international cooperation is needed to deal with them," he said.
He said Japan could understand Indonesia`s objections to a cooperation agreement signed by 14 Asian countries on
the issue but would continue to invite Indonesia to join it.
It was agreed in the Asean Regional Forum in Bali last week that the security of the strait was the sovereignty
of the three littoral countries.
Other countries would only be allowed to conduct cooperation indirectly such as providing training and radar.
The 14th meeting co-hosted by Indonesia and China was also attended by non-Asean member countries such as Mongolia,
Australia, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
The Chinese foreign ministry`s director of Asian affairs, Yu Hong, said China accepted and respected the territorial
sovereignty of the littoral countries over the strait and was ready to help them with non-military assistance.
Indonesia continued approaching the US and Japan to make them understand its stance because the two countries were
the biggest users of the waterway.(*)
http://www.antara.co.id/en/arc/2007/8/29/ri-rejects-any-effort-to-internationalize-malacca-strait/
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Color-Coded World Map Waterways - World
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Juwono Sudarsono
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Donald H Rumsfeld
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Indonesian Scolds U.S.
on Terrorism Fight
By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Published: June 7, 2006
JAKARTA, Indonesia, June 6 — Indonesia's defense minister warned the Bush administration on Tuesday that its
approach to fighting terrorism was perceived as overbearing, and that the United States needed to be sensitive
to local concerns.
"It's best that you leave the main responsibility of antiterrorist measures to the
local government in question,
and not be too overly insistent about immediate results arising from your perception about terrorists,"
Defense
Minister Juwono Sudarsono told reporters as Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld stood nearby.
"It's important to us because, as the world's largest Muslim country, we are very
aware of the perception, or misperception, that the United States is overbearing and overpresent and overwhelming
in every sector of life in many nations and cultures," he added.
Mr. Rumsfeld arrived here Tuesday to help build the United States' newly restored ties with the Indonesian military.
American military aid was gradually phased out after Indonesian security forces fired on civilians who were protesting
Indonesian rule in East Timor in 1991.
In rebuilding ties with the Indonesian military, the Bush administration has said it is not only solidifying relations
with an ally in its campaign against terrorist groups, but also reinforcing the importance of respecting human
rights.
"The U.S. has established fully normal relations, with military-to-military relations with Indonesia,"
said Mr. Rumsfeld, who met with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono; Widodo Adi Sutjipto, a senior minister for
security issues; and Mr. Sudarsono.
Some American lawmakers complain, however, that Indonesian officials who were linked to the abuses in East Timor
have not been held accountable.
On Tuesday, it was the Indonesians who were free with their advice.
One important lesson, Mr. Sudarsono said, was that the United States needed to be attuned
to local concerns.
Then the minister took the unusual step of repeating the counsel he had given Mr. Rumsfeld in a room packed
with Indonesian and Western journalists.
"So I was telling the secretary just recently, just two minutes ago, that your powerful
economy and your powerful military does lend to misperception and a sense of threat by many groups right across
the world, not just in Indonesia," Mr. Sudarsono said.
Mr. Sudarsono's remarks prompted a quick reply by Mr. Rumsfeld, who insisted he had been sensitive to other nations'
concerns from the start. "I have never indicated to any country that they should
do something that they were uncomfortable doing," Mr. Rumsfeld said.
The discussion over political perceptions had affected deliberations over one of the Bush administration's major
efforts: the Proliferation Security Initiative, which calls for an international arrangement that would enable
the United States and its allies to search cargo ships suspected of transporting biological, chemical and nuclear
arms, as well as the missiles to deliver them.
The aim of the initiative, announced in 2003, is to keep unconventional weapons and their components out of the
hands of terrorist groups and so-called rogue states. But the Indonesian government has been wary, perhaps because
it wants to reinforce its claims over nearby waterways, or because it is concerned about public opinion regarding
efforts to collaborate with the Bush administration.
Indonesia's Foreign Ministry bluntly rejected the initiative as a threat to Indonesian sovereignty when Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice raised it in a March visit here.
Mr. Sudarsono was somewhat more supportive. In his closed-door meeting with Mr. Rumsfeld, he indicated that the
proposal would be studied, and suggested that Indonesia would be willing to carry out some of the activities that
are called for under the plan.
Yet at the news conference, Mr. Sudarsono gave a starker assessment, suggesting that the plan might be carried
out only if it was limited in scope. "Perhaps we can agree on a limited framework of cooperation on an ad
hoc basis.," he said.
Those comments caught Mr. Rumsfeld's team by surprise. It was not immediately clear whether Mr. Sudarsono was trying
to balance domestic political considerations with his efforts to work with the Americans, or if there was
a more fundamental difference between the sides.
"Some Indonesian analysts view the United States as focused on the 'search and destroy' aspect of the war
against terror, and feel that the United States has not focused sufficient attention to winning the 'hearts and
minds' aspect of the struggle," according to a study by the Congressional Research Service.
In resuming American military assistance, the initial emphasis is to improve the Indonesian military's mobility,
by providing spare parts for C-130 aircraft and helping to upgrade naval patrol vessels. The Indonesians have also
indicated that they are submitting requests for parts for the F-16 warplanes in their arsenal.
A senior American military official said the Pentagon wanted to improve the ability of the Indonesian military
to carry out disaster relief operations, to conduct joint operations with the United States, and to secure the
Strait of Malacca and other waterways.
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Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the National Security Council/1/
Washington, August 4, 1967.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 INDON. Secret. A covering
memorandum from Deputy Executive Secretary of State John P. Walsh to Bromley Smith indicates that the paper was
prepared for the NSC meeting on Indonesia on August 9 and had "the working level concurrence of the Treasury,
CIA, DOD, and JCS and was approved by Katzenbach and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Eugene
V. Rostow.
SUBJECT
Further Deterioration in Relations with Indonesia
Political (Excerpt)
3. Sukarno has been eliminated as a political force. The "New Order"
led by General Suharto is well established in power, and
is neutralizing gradually "Old Order"
hold-outs in the police, marine corps, and parts of Central and East Java. Suharto and his associates
showed sophistication and a fine sense of timing in managing the transition.
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Territorial Waters And Exclusive Economic Zone
When independence was proclaimed and sovereignty gained, Indonesia had to enact laws to govern the seas in accordance
with the geographic structure of an archipelagic state. This, however, did not mean that the country would bar
international passage. The laws were necessary instruments for the unity and national resilience of the country,
with a territory that embraces all the islands, the islets and the seas in between.
In view of the country’s susceptibility to foreign intervention from the sea and for domestic security reasons,
on December 13, 1957, the Indonesian Government issued a declaration on the territorial waters of the Republic.
It stated that all the waters surrounding and between the islands in the territory came within Indonesia’s sovereignty.
It also determined that the country’s territorial water limit was 12 miles, measured from a straight baseline drawn
from the outermost points of the islands.
In the past, archipelagic states like Indonesia have unilaterally determined their 200-mile-Exclusive Economic
Zones. Today such economic zones are confirmed by the International Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was
ratified by the Indonesian Government on October 18. 1983, by Act No. 5 of the same year. This is the legal basis
of the Indonesian-Exclusive Economic Zone.
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The Archipelagic State Concept, or Wawasan Nusantara, maintains that not only the land but all the waters between
the islands are under the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia, including the seabed and subsoil, as well as
the air space. This concept of territorial rights represented a radical departure from traditional maritime law,
which only recognized jurisdiction three miles from the shore of any island. All the marine areas beyond were traditionally
considered international high seas to be exploited by any party for any purpose.
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The archipelagic sea lanes passing through the Indonesian sea territory are:
ALKI I : Sunda Strait-Karimata Strait-Natuna Sea-South China Sea.
ALKI II : Lombok Strait-Makasar Strait-Sulawesi Sea.
ALKI III-A : Sawu Sea-Ombai Strait-Banda Sea (Western part of Buru lsland)-Seram Sea (Eastern part of Mongole 1sland)-Maluku
Sea-Pacific Ocean.
ALKI III-B : Timor Sea-Leti Strait-Banda Sea (Western part of Buru lsland)-Seram Sea (Eastern part of Mongole Island)
-Maluku Sea-Pacific Ocean.
ALKI III-C : Arafuru Sea-Banda Sea (Western part of Buru lsland)-Seram Sea (Eastern part of Mongole Island)-Maluku
Sea-Pacific Ocean.
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The persistent Western effort to control Indonesia and
its strategic location in the Cold War context has also
profoundly impacted various political developments
Marine (KKO) Commander Lt. General Hartono,
Navy Chief Admiral Martadinata and his successor Admiral Muljadi.
The quest to control Indonesian waterways, to overrule and eliminate Sukarno's
"Wawasan Nusantara" concept is rumored to be related to the sudden deaths
of 3 high ranking ALRI (Indonesian Navy) commanders supporting this maritime concept.
The Navy Command supported the Wawasan Nusantara Concept.
After Sukarno's removal the then Navy leadership is rumored to have been considered
a continued obstacle to the western efforts to control strategic Indonesian
sea lanes.
(Wawasan Nusantara - Indonesian doctrine of the political and security unity of
archipelagic land and sea space)
This subject has never been thoroughly researched.
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After Suharto replaced Sukarno trade routes thru
Indonesian waterways were opened,
the US 7th Fleet had undisputed use of thoroughfares
thru Indonesian waterways from
the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean.
Vital maritime passage between the Pacific
and the Indian Ocean had been secured
for both military and commercial purposes.
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Declassified State Department
documents reveal the US interest in
removal of Hartono and Muljadi from their influential positions.
The US apparently welcomed a decision to replace the Navy command as reflected in
the March 15, 1967 telegram from Ambassador
Marshal Green to the State Department,
in which he refers to the pending removal of Navy Minister/Chief of Staff Muljadi and
KKO (Marine) commander Hartono as follows:
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Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State/1/
Djakarta, March 15, 1967, 1105Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15 INDON. Secret. Repeated
to Bangkok, Canberra, CINCPAC for POLAD, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Medan, Singapore, Surabaya, Tokyo, and
Wellington.
4287. Subject: Post-MPRS Political Situation.
Excerpt:
Changes in top navy and police leadership is high on agenda. Suharto
perhaps
hopes that Navy Minister Muljadi, Marine Commandant Hartono and
Police Minister Sutjipto will fall of their own weight once their underlings assess
their failure to influence significantly outcome of MPRS session.
After cooling off period, Suharto might personally take hand in their ouster
and perhaps ask Adam Malik to cough up more Ambassadorial positions.
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Note from Editor:
Admiral Muljadi subsequently became Ambassador to the Sovjet Union in 1970.
He died suddenly, reportedly from a heart attack in August 1972.
Admiral Muljadi succeeded Navy Chief Admiral Martadinata who died November 1966 in a questionable helicopter accident
in the Puncak area in clear daylight.
KKO Lt General Hartono became Ambassador for North Korea in 1969.
He died January 1971 under suspicious circumstances when visiting Jakarta, officially
reported as suicide.
His wife Grace Hartono, supported by Hartono's KKO colleagues and friends (a.o. previous Jakarta Governor KKO
Lt General Ali Sadikin), disputes that he committed suicide.
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If not directly involved in these sudden deaths, the US ambition to control the
strategic Indonesian waterways certainly played an important role in the removal of these officers from their
commanding positions. Their subsequent sudden deaths raises suspicions as to who
wanted them silenced forever.
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Pacific Choke
Point
By Richard Halloran
The US military now feels a need to keep a wary eye on the Strait of Malacca and its neighborhood.
Halfway around the world from the US mainland, between Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia, runs the 550-mile-long
trait of Malacca, a route traversed by tens of thousands of merchant and warships sailing between the
Pacific and Indian Oceans. At its eastern terminus, the strait opens into the South China Sea.
Linked together, they form a choke point extraordinaire that exists in the shadow of armed pirates, stateless terrorists,
and national armed forces. If the world were to lose access for an extended period, the consequences for the industrialized
world, including the United States, would be grave.
Read complete article
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Prospects for and strategic implications
of a communist takeover in Indonesia
The Problem
To estimate the chances and implications of a
Communist takeover in Indonesia within the next two or three years.
Discussion
I. Prospects for a Communist Takeover
1. Sukarno is the unchallenged leader of Indonesia
and will almost certainly remain so until death or infirmity removes him from the scene. He is developing in Indonesia
an authoritarian government of the "national-front" type on which the Indonesian
Communist Party (PKI) exerts the strongest influence, though under his own continued domination. The past year
or two have been characterized by rapid progress toward this objective. The PKI now claims 3,000,000 members and
is by far the best organized and most dynamic political entity in Indonesia. With Sukarno's support, the Communists
and their sympathizers have come to occupy a major position in the central government and in numerous provincial
and local administrations. Whatever its present influence on Sukarno, it is clear that the PKI finds Sukarno's
policies, both domestic and foreign, compatible with its own interests. It does not create these policies, but
provides specific suggestions on method and timing which Sukarno finds acceptable. His own predilections, skillfully
played upon by the PKI, have brought his foreign policy into close harmony with that of the Communist states of
Asia.
2. Communist fortunes in Indonesia will probably continue to prosper so long as Sukarno stays in power. As in the
past, however, he will probably move cautiously in expanding PKI participation in the government so as to avoid
creating excessive domestic unrest or encouraging a coalition of non-Communist elements. If Sukarno lives, it is
probable that in two or three years the Indonesian state will be sufficiently controlled by the Communists to be
termed a Communist state, even though Sukarno remains the acknowledged leader. It will probably not be possible,
however, to detect any precise moment at which the Communists "take over," unless Sukarno chooses to
proclaim it. We believe that domestic political considerations and his desire to bequeath his personal political
concepts to Indonesia will lead him to refrain from such an announcement. Conceivably, the PKI leaders could become
powerful enough to threaten Sukarno's own dominance, but since his policies are likely to remain along lines generally
favorable to them, they are unlikely to take risks in order to seize power.
3. In the event of Sukarno's early death or incapacity, the PKI drive to power would probably be slowed for
a time. Though there would be considerable political turmoil and perhaps some violence, the successor government
would probably be headed at first by a coalition of familiar non-Communist military and civilian names. The PKI
could probably not be denied an important share in this government, both because of its established position and
because the military would probably be reluctant to risk civil war to initiate a roll back of the Communists. On
the other hand, the party would no longer benefit from Sukarno's patronage and would have to rely entirely on its
own strengths and capabilities, which though considerable would probably be insufficient to encourage an open challenge
to the military. Hence, we believe that the PKI would not attempt to seize full power by force in the months following
Sukarno's death if that occurred at any early date.
4. The longer Sukarno lives, the better will be the position of the PKI after his death. Another two or three years
of his rule are likely to weaken anti-Communist elements in the army and elsewhere to the point where, at his death,
the Communists would have a good chance of taking over full power. We do not exclude other possibilities, however,
such as the emergence of a coalition of anti-Communists leading to a protracted stalemate or to a conflict which
could break up the Indonesian state.
II. Implications
5. Sukarno's Indonesia already acts in important respects like a Communist state and is more openly hostile
to the US than most Communist nations. Much of the damage that an avowedly Communist Indonesia could do to the
Western position in the Far East is being done (e.g., "confrontation" of Malaysia and subversion and
infiltration in the Philippines) and neither Sukarno nor any probable successor government is likely to abandon
efforts to weaken the West in this area.
6. Nevertheless, the overt accession to communism of a country like Indonesia--large, populous, rich in resources,
and strategically situated--would have an important impact on other countries in South and East Asia. Peking would
be especially gratified by the triumph of one of its closest associates and, for a time, would probably offer close
cooperation in the Malaysian area. Both Peking and Hanoi would be encouraged in their struggle with the US in Vietnam,
while the confidence of Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam would be undermined. The advent of a Communist state
on the Indian Ocean would make India increasingly nervous.
7. Given Indonesia's limited military capability and its many strategic vulnerabilities, a Communist Indonesia
would pose only a potential threat to the Western position in Southeast Asia and to important world sea and air
lanes. The threat of a Communist Indonesia would be felt most immediately in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Australia,
and would lead their governments to make urgent demands for substantial US and Commonwealth military support.
8. The conservative Malaysian government would despair of a satisfactory settlement of its dispute with Djakarta.
Furthermore, it would expect intensification of Indonesian efforts to subvert the peninsular Malays, and increased
cooperation between Djakarta and Peking in arming and training dissidents on the Thai-Malayan border and in northern
Borneo. Singapore would face an intensified effort to subvert its Chinese population. Both governments would face
increased pressure by all left-wing political and labor groups. The Commonwealth presence would probably make it
possible for moderate governments in the two states to survive for the period of this estimate, but over a longer
period the existence of a Communist Indonesia would cause their chances of survival to diminish.
9. The Philippine Government, already concerned about Indonesian infiltration of the southern islands as well
as Djakarta's clandestine political activities in Manila itself, would show real alarm. Irritants in its relations
with the US would probably be submerged for a time in a sense of common danger. The Australians would fear for
East New Guinea and their lines of communication to Europe and the Far East.
10. As a major Communist state led by a markedly independent and self-reliant party, Indonesia would become the
object of more intense Sino-Soviet rivalry. Moscow would
probably increase its military and economic assistance in hopes of encouraging the development of a second Asian
Communist power center to compete with Peking. For its part, the PKI would probably take a friendlier attitude
toward Moscow in the interest of material gain. Peking would, of course, increase its efforts to tie Djakarta even
more closely to Chinese policy in the Far East. But it is likely that PKI foreign policy decisions, like those
of Sukarno, would stress Indonesian national interests above those of Peking, Moscow, or international communism
in general. The pursuit of these national interests would be more likely to lead to friction with the Chinese Communists
than with the Soviets. Thus, Indonesia's formal accession to communism, while immediately strengthening the Communist
side, would contribute over the longer run to transforming the Communist world into a looser association of sovereign
states.
11. A Communist Indonesia would probably not become of major military significance to either Moscow
or Peking during the period of this estimate. An Indonesia openly led by the PKI might
ask for security guarantees from Moscow and Peking, and such requests might, in the circumstances, be difficult
to reject. We believe that the PKI leaders would be sufficiently nationalistic to refuse to grant air or naval
bases or missile sites to either Moscow or Peking, though it is possible that they would permit one or both to
use existing Indonesian bases for logistical purposes, thereby greatly extending the range, for example, of their
submarines. In any bargaining with Moscow or Peking on the subject of bases or missile sites, the Indonesians would
undoubtedly be favorably impressed by offers of nuclear weapons in exchange. It is extremely doubtful, however,
that Moscow would make such an offer, and, over the next two or three years, unlikely that Peking would be in a
position to do so.
12. In the short term, Indonesia's formal accession to communism would have a heavy impact on world politics.
It would be seen as a major change in the international balance of political forces and would inject new life into
the thesis that communism is the wave of the future. But while Communists around the world would be encouraged,
and their opponents disturbed, this event would not by itself cause other nations to follow suit or even necessarily
to alter their foreign policies.
13. The longer term impact of a Communist Indonesia would depend primarily on the degree
of success or failure which the PKI met as it moved to energize and unite the Indonesian nation. If these efforts
succeeded, Indonesia would provide a powerful example for the underdeveloped world and hence a credit to communism
and a setback for Western prestige. It is much more likely that the early years of a Communist Indonesia
would be occupied with consolidating political control and resuscitating the Indonesian economy and that, during
this period, Indonesia would be more liability than asset to the Communist powers.
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The Sovjets stir up the Pacific
Time Magazine
Monday, Mar. 23, 1981
The gateway between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean—and the choke point through which passes virtually all of
the Middle Eastern oil on which Japan's economy depends—is the Strait of Malacca, a channel 30 miles wide at its
narrowest point, between the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian island of Sumatra. Here too Soviet naval activity
has been on the rise, in both obvious and not-so-obvious ways. Soviet destroyers, cruisers and diesel-powered,
torpedo-firing Foxtrot submarines have been passing through the strait at the rate of about six a month, while
nuclear-powered Echo-class subs, armed with antiship cruise missiles, prowl the South China Sea. Malacca is so
shallow that subs must go through with at least their conning towers awash and therefore tend to make the passage
at night. But the Indonesian navy believes fully submerged Soviet subs have been testing the deeper waters of the
Sunda Strait off the southern tip of Sumatra and the Lombok Strait off Bali as alternative, less conspicuous ways
of slipping into the Indian Ocean. The neutralist Indonesians are so concerned about Soviet penetration of their
archipelago that they are considering asking the U.S. for submarine-detection equipment with which to monitor the
underwater traffic through Sunda and Lombok.
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The deaths of Amiral Martadinata (October 1966), Lt General KKO Hartono (January 1971) and Admiral
Muljadi
is rumored to be part of an international conspiracy aimed at securing control of Indonesian waterways,
a highly desired connection between the Indian and Pacific Ocean.
The United States remains the dominant regional military power throughout the Pacific.
President Sukarno was not willing to provide the US unlimited access to
the Indonesian straits, which are deeper than the Strait of Malacca.
In 1964 their request for passage of the nuclear ship Atlantis was not granted.
Declassified State Department documents reveal that the US considered ignoring the refusal.
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Conclusion and Recommendations
It appears that the conclusions reached by the Bunker Mission, namely, that a large reduction in the American
presence in Indonesia would produce a better climate in which to conduct US/Indonesian relations, are being proved
fallacious and that time may be running out on U.S. efforts to placate Sukarno. Perhaps our moderation in dealing
with Indonesia has misled Sukarno to believe that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. There
are nearly 100 million people in Indonesia who by all logic and past history should be pro-American. I am convinced
they are truly afraid of Communist China but have the delusion that they (Indos) are clever enough to handle them
and/or are convinced that the U.S. will back down and leave the Communist Chinese in a commanding position.
Therefore, it might be appropriate to consider what measures we should take to make clear our determination
to use the international waters around the Indonesian islands and also to counteract the political impact of the
possible detonation of an atomic bomb in Indonesia. The following steps might be taken:
1. Reopen with State the question of sending one or more Navy ships through the Indonesian
Straits
"unannounced" to demonstrate our refusal to accept
the Indonesian claim to these as territorial waters.
2. Encourage the Atlantis II to carry out that part of its survey in the Banda Sea which is clearly outside Indonesian
territorial waters and make it clear we will not stand for any harassment.
3. Reconsider our decision to permit Philco Corporation to build a three-site communication system for the Indonesian
Army. The Indonesians apparently are delaying any decision in this matter in order to reap a full political harvest
from Malaysia's bitter reaction to the United States support for its "enemy". Although I supported the
decision and feel the opposition to this sale is largely emotional, I'm leaning toward reneging now, not just because
of Commonwealth opposition, but because of continued Sukarno boorishness.
4. Take steps to minimize the political impact if Indonesia should detonate an atomic bomb. Such a detonation
is hardly possible without ChiCom help but the Indos have surprised us before. The event would alarm not only the
Malaysians but the Fils, too.
F. J. Blouin/4/
Rear Admiral, USN
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The Maritime Command, in the 1960's fully supported Sukarno's Archipelagic Concept,
giving the country the right to control its waters international passage.
Territorial Waters
When independence was proclaimed and sovereignty gained, Indonesia had to enact laws to govern the seas in accordance
with the geographic structure of an archipelagic state. This, however, did not mean that the country would bar
international passage. The laws were necessary instruments for the unity and national resilience of the country,
with a territory that embraces all the islands, the islets and the seas in between. In view of the country's susceptibility
to foreign intervention from the sea and for domestic security reasons, on December 13, 1957, the Indonesian Government
issued a declaration on the territorial waters of the Republic. It stated that all the waters surrounding and between
the islands in the territory came within Indonesia's sovereignty. It also determined that the country's territorial
water limit was 12 miles, measured from a straight baseline drawn from the outermost points of the islands. In
the past, archipelagic states like Indonesia have unilaterally determined their 200-mile-Exclusive Economic Zones
The laws were necessary instruments for the unity and national resilience of the country, with a territory that
embraces all the islands, the islets and the seas in between.In view of the country’s susceptibility to foreign
intervention from the sea and for domestic security reasons, on December 13, 1957, the Indonesian Government issued
a declaration on the territorial waters of the Republic. It stated that all the waters surrounding and between
the islands in the territory came within Indonesia’s sovereignty.
It also determined that the country’s territorial water limit was 12 miles, measured from a straight baseline drawn
from the outermost points of the islands.In the past, archipelagic states like Indonesia have unilaterally determined
their 200-mile-Exclusive Economic Zones.
The US apparently welcomed a decision to replace the Navy command as reflected
in the March 15, 1967 communication from
Ambassador Marshal Green to the State Department, in which he refers to the pending removal of Navy Minister/Chief
of Staff Muljadi and KKO (Marine) commander Hartono as follows:
Changes in top navy and police leadership is high on agenda. Suharto perhaps hopes
that Navy Minister Muljadi,
Marine Commandant Hartono and Police Minister Sutjipto will fall of their
own weight once their underlings assess
their failure to influence significantly outcome of MPRS session.
After cooling off period, Suharto might personally take hand in their ouster
and perhaps ask Adam Malik to cough up more Ambassadorial positions.
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Western Allies Press Indonesia
to Open More Sea-Lanes to Warships
By Michael RichardsonPublished: THURSDAY, MAY 16, 1996
JAKARTA: The United States and several allies are pressing Indonesia, whose sea-lanes have long been a key highway
for naval vessels sailing between the Asia-Pacific region and the Indian Ocean, to open its waters more widely
to free passage of foreign warships, especially submarines.
In sensitive negotiations, Indonesia has proposed three special sea-lanes running in a north-south direction that
international shipping could use with minimal restrictions to pass through Indonesian waters.
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But the United States, Britain and Australia, supported in principle by Japan, want Indonesia to agree to an
east-west sea-lane as well. It would connect directly with the Malacca Strait, the route used by most ships traveling
between East Asia and the Gulf.
General John M. Shalikashvili, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said here Wednesday that
"as a seafaring nation, we have a deep interest in having the maximum freedom of
movement in the seas."
The general said that "the specifics of those matters are best left to the negotiators who are involved in
those issues right now."
Negotiations between Indonesian and U.S. officials will resume in Jakarta on Friday, while those with Australia
will continue in June.
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Analysts said that these negotiations and the visit here by General Shalikashvili, the first
by the most senior officer in the U.S. armed forces, underlined the
strategic importance of Indonesia. Washington has designated Indonesia as one of 10 high-priority countries or
growth zones expected to emerge as major
economic and political powers — and lucrative markets — in the first quarter of the 21st century.
Indonesia is also the world's largest archipelago, with more than 17,000 islands stretching along the Equator for
5,120 kilometers (3,200 miles).
Deepwater straits between some of these islands allow foreign warships to pass quickly and safely between the South
China Sea and the Pacific Ocean in the north, and the Indian Ocean in the south.
Submarines can pass the same way undetected by remaining submerged without danger of collision.
Analysts said that for military planners of maritime powers, Indonesia's position between the Pacific and Indian
oceans had become even more important after the entry into force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea in 1994.
Before then, the Java Sea and many other large bodies of water between Indonesia's islands were treated as open
seas; under the treaty, they became internal waters under Indonesia's control as an "archipelagic state."
In such waters that are used normally by foreign shipping, the law of innocent passage applies.
Under this regime: Submarines are supposed to travel on the surface and fly their national flag.
Warships are required by some countries to shut down their surveillance radars and weapons sensors, although officials
said Indonesia was only asking that there should be no unauthorized broadcasting or radio contact between passing
warships and land-based transmitters to prevent spying.
Military aircraft have no rights to fly over internal waters without permission from the coastal state, which can
also suspend innocent passage and close areas to foreign planes and ships on security grounds, for example if it
wants to hold military exercises.
To meet the concerns of the United States and other maritime powers on the need for unimpeded transit, Indonesia
and other archipelagic states recognized by the treaty, including the Philippines, agreed to designate special
sea-lanes so that foreign warships and submarines could pass through without innocent-passage restrictions.
Tony Vincent, who heads the Australian negotiators, said that Indonesia was the first archipelagic state to designate
proposed sea-lanes and open talks on them with interested parties. "So it is setting a precedent," he
said.
Indonesia has proposed three north-south sea-lanes: through the Sunda and Karimata straits to the South China Sea;
through the Lombok and Makassar straits to the South China Sea, and from the Indian Ocean and Arafura Sea north
of Australia to the Pacific Ocean via the Molucca Sea in Indonesia.
Mr. Vincent said that under the treaty, Australia believed that Indonesia should also designate as special sea-lanes
routes that were traditionally used by international shipping, including an east-west sea-lane via the Java Sea
to the Malacca Strait.
Indonesian officials, however, said that many of the proposed additional sea-lanes were too shallow or had become
too crowded with local vessels and oil and gas rigs for safe passage by foreign naval vessels, especially submerged
submarines.
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Ali Alatas, Indonesia's foreign minister, said that by offering the three widely used
north-south routes as special sea-lanes, Indonesia was trying to interpret its commitment under the treaty "in
a way that we think is reasonable."
But he said that the United States and Australia were "not very happy" with the proposal.
"They want a fourth archipelagic sea-lane going east-west through the Java Sea," he said. "But we
have told them that the Java Sea is full of undersea cables and oil rigs. It's a very shallow sea, in many parts
only 45 meters. So we are rather reluctant to make it an archipelagic sea-lane."
If no agreement can be reached, Indonesia could seek to have its special sea-lanes formally designated by the International
Maritime Organization, a United Nations agency.
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But Mr. Alatas said that Jakarta would like to have "a good agreement with all users so that there is no question
of conflict or tensions." He said that Indonesia's aim now was to "convince our partners that the offer
of these three sea-lane passages is a good offer and that for the rest they can use other routes on the basis of
innocent passage."
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This is the html version of the file
http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/testWalshTestimony070927.pdf.
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Our Navy can better protect the United States and the American people if we join the Law of the Sea Convention.
The Law of the Sea Convention is the bedrock legal instrument for public order in the world’s oceans. It codifies,
in a manner that only binding treaty law can, the navigation and overflight rights, and high seas freedoms that
are essential for the global strategic mobility of our Armed Forces, including:
1 The Right of Innocent Passage, which allows ships to transit through foreign territorial seas without providing
the coastal
State prior notification or gaining the coastal State’s prior permission.
2 The Right of Transit Passage, which allows ships, aircraft, and submarines to transit through, over, and under
straits used for
international navigation and the approaches to those straits.
3 The Right of Archipelagic Sealanes Passage, which, like transit passage, allows transit
by ships and aircraft through,
over, and under normal passage routes in archipelagic states, such as Indonesia.
4 The right of high seas freedoms, including overflight and transit within the Exclusive Economic Zone.
Innocent Passage, Transit Passage, and Archipelagic Sealanes Passage are the crown jewels of navigation and overflight.
These rights are vital not just to our Navy, but also to our Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.
They make it possible to move vast quantities of war materiel through the Straits of Gibraltar, Singapore, Malacca,
and Hormuz
and into the Arabian Gulf to Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines in Iraq.
These rights permit us to move our submarine fleet through choke points to conduct all missions.
They permit the United States Air Force to conduct global missions without requirement to overfly foreign national
airspace.
And they ensure the uninterrupted flow of commerce to and from our shores
National Security/Defense Benefits
Convention extremely favorable to U.S.
– Limits breadth of territorial sea
– Innocent passage
– Transit passage through international straits
– Archipelagic sealanes passage
– Freedom of navigation and overflight in in EEZs
– Unrestricted military activities in high seas
– Right of approach and visit
– Legitimate coastal state authority in territorial sea and contiguous zones
The Convention also allows us to exercise high seas freedoms in foreign exclusive economic zones, including
conducting military activities without coastal state interference. And this is important---the single most contentious
issue in oceans law and policy today is the attempt by some foreign coastal States to treat the exclusive economic
zone – or EEZ — like a territorial sea.
The Convention makes clear that coastal States enjoy resource rights within the EEZ, but they do not enjoy and
may not assert
full sovereignty within the EEZ.
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The Development and Operational Impact of Indonesia's Approved Partial System of Archipelagic Sea Lanes
This paper describes those limitations and discusses whether or not they will change once Indonesia designates
the partial system of archipelagic sea lanes ...
DTIC - Defense Technical Information Center
Accession Number : ADA370753
Handle / proxy Url : http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA370753 Check NTIS Availability...
Report Date : 17 MAY 1999
Abstract : The Indonesian archipelago is a critical maritime and air crossroad within the Asia-Pacific theater
of operations. U.S. planners involved in preparing and executing military operations in this theater must be knowledgeable
concerning both the physical and legal limitations on sea and air routes which deploying U.S. forces will use in
traversing this vast archipelago. This paper describes those limitations and discusses whether or not they will
change once Indonesia designates the partial system of archipelagic sea lanes recently adopted by the International
Maritime Organization (IMO). Because the process of adopting archipelagic sea lanes by the IMO can adversely effect
navigation and overflight rights required by U.S. forces in order to transit the Indonesian archipelago, this paper
also describes certain issues which arose at the IMO which had the potential to effect operational planning dependent
upon these rights. The paper concludes that should Indonesia choose to designate its approved partial system of
archipelagic sea lanes, there will be no impact on operational planning and relatively minor impact on the tactical
conduct of our forces.
Descriptors : *MARINE TRANSPORTATION, *ROUTING, *INDONESIA, *ARCHIPELAGOES, MILITARY OPERATIONS, NAVIGATION, LIMITATIONS,
MILITARY PLANNING, AIR TRAFFIC, LAW ENFORCEMENT.
Subject Categories : MARINE ENGINEERING
Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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Dire Strait?
Energy Security in the Strait of Malacca
Event Summary
An Asia Program Event
Cosponsored by the Wilson Center’s Division of International Security Studies and Environmental Change and Security
Program; Georgetown University’s
Center for Peace and Security Studies; and the U.S. Army’s Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series
Mikkal E. Herberg, National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR); Catherine Zara Raymond, Travel Risks (Singapore); David
Rosenberg, Middlebury College;
and Bronson Edwards Percival, CNA Corporation
Foreign Policy magazine recently designated the Strait of Malacca as one of the world’s five top global chokepoints.
This narrow waterway, which divides
Indonesia’s Sumatra Island and western Malaysia, is a hub of global trade and one of the world’s busiest sealanes.
Significant amounts of the world’s energy
needs pass through the strait, including large percentages of Northeast Asia’s oil and liquid natural gas (LNG).
There is concern, however, that piracy and
terrorism may jeopardize the safe transport of these energy needs. This Asia Program event sought to make a measured
assessment of energy security in
the Malacca Strait.
Mikkal E. Herberg provided an overview of the Malacca Strait’s energy geopolitics. He projected that by 2030, two-thirds
of Asia’s total oil consumption will
pass through the strait, including 22 million barrels of oil per day. He asserted, however, that assessing energy
security in the Malacca Strait requires a
broad framework. The Malacca Strait, he argued, is a “codeword” for the sealanes of East and Southeast Asia as
a whole. In the event of a blockage in the
strait, tankers could use alternate sea routes. For this reason, control of Southeast Asia’s many sealanes is a
paramount energy security concern;
by 2030, for example, the South China Sea is expected to service as much LNG as the Strait of Malacca.
While the United States “dominates” the sealanes today, Herberg averred that China fears this dominance and may
seek to reduce it.
See Herberg Powerpoint presentation :
The Geopolitics of Energy and the Malacca Straits
The National Bureau if Asia Research
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Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 16
Indonesia Archipelagic Sea Lanes
Lieutenant Commander Penny Campbell, RAN
Indonesia is, both geographically and legally, an archipelagic nation. The concept that the nation is a single
entity comprised of the entirety of the archipelagoes, their individual islands and surrounding waters, is a core
Indonesian belief, known as Wawasan Nusantara (archipelagic outlook). (footnote 1) With this fundamental belief
rooted in its national psyche, Indonesia was one of several states that successfully advocated special recognition
for archipelagic states during a series of international negotiations, which culminated in the 1982 United Nations
Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC). Indonesia was the first archipelagic nation to take advantage of the archipelagic
regime provided by LOSC. Accordingly, Indonesia's initial proposal to designate archipelagic sea lanes (ASL) compelled
the international community to consider how the theoretically derived legal provisions of the Convention were to
be implemented.
LOSC represents a compromise between the growing jurisdiction of coastal states over their adjoining waters and
the desire of other states to retain their historical freedom of the seas. This compromise is neatly illustrated
in Part IV of LOSC, which deals with archipelagic states. It recognises the archipelagic state's sovereignty over
its archipelagic waters, but requires that this sovereignty be subject to the regime of archipelagic sea lanes
passage. For an archipelagic state to benefit from the regime in Part IV, it must meet two criteria. Firstly, it
must satisfy the definition of an archipelagic state, and secondly it must draw its baselines in accordance with
the LOSC provisions.
Article 46 of LOSC defines an archipelagic state as one that is 'constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos'
and which may include other islands. An archipelago means a group of islands and other natural features which 'are
so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic
and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such.' In many respects, this definition embodies
the Wawasan Nusantara concept.
An archipelagic state may draw straight baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and
drying reefs. The baselines must enclose the main islands of the archipelago, and the enclosed water to land ratio
must be between 1:1 and 9:1. This requirement prevents island countries such as New Zealand or the United Kingdom,
which are made up of a few dominant islands, from claiming archipelagic status. It also ensures that states with
widely dispersed archipelagoes such as Kiribati and Tuvalu cannot draw baselines around small distant islands.
(footnote 2) The waters within the straight baselines are called archipelagic waters. Each straight baseline must
be less than 100 nm in length but up to 3 percent of the total number of baselines can be up to a maximum length
of 125 nm. This rather complex formula was designed with Indonesia's circumstances in mind, as Indonesia's longest
straight baseline is 124 nm.
An archipelagic state enjoys sovereignty over its archipelagic waters, and two passage regimes apply in all archipelagic
waters: those of innocent passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage.
All vessels, including warships, enjoy the right of innocent passage through archipelagic waters, but the archipelagic
state may temporarily suspend innocent passage, on a non-discriminatory basis, through specified areas when the
suspension is essential for the protection of the state's security. Innocent passage requires a vessel to conduct
continuous and expeditious transit in a manner that is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of
the archipelagic state.
An archipelagic state may designate ASL, and corresponding air routes, which are suitable for continuous and expeditious
passage through the archipelago. Article 53(9) of LOSC requires a cooperative approach between the archipelagic
state and the international community before ASLs can be formally promulgated. If it wishes to designate ASLs,
the archipelagic state must refer the proposal to the 'competent international organisation' with a view to their
adoption. That organisation may only adopt such ASLs as may be agreed with the archipelagic state, after which
the archipelagic state may designate them.
The phrase 'competent international organisation' is not explained in the text of LOSC but in 1994 the UN Division
of Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea published a list of UN bodies expert in particular subject areas. The International
Maritime Organisation (IMO) was acknowledged as the relevant competent organisation for the purposes of LOSC Article
53. The IMO was created by international convention to assist states in adopting 'the highest practicable standards
in matters concerning maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of marine pollution
from ships'. (footnote 3) The IMO provides guidance on ships routing systems, which includes guidance on the adoption,
designation and substitution of ASL.
An archipelagic state does not have to designate ASL, but if it does, LOSC Article 53(4) requires that the designation
include all normal passage routes used for international navigation. It is this requirement to designate all routes
that came under special scrutiny in light of Indonesia's proposal.
The passage regime that applies in ASLs -archipelagic sea lanes passage (ASLP)-permits transiting vessels to operate
in their normal mode. Normal mode is a more lenient regime than innocent passage. For example, a submarine can
transit submerged through an ASL but must transit on the surface while undertaking innocent passage, and a ship
may launch and recover aircraft in an ASL but may not do so on innocent passage. Importantly, while an archipelagic
state may suspend innocent passage on a temporary basis for security reasons, it cannot suspend ASLP under any
circumstances.
Until an archipelagic state has completely designated its ASLs, vessels can exercise ASLP through all routes normally
used for international navigation. Once a complete ASL designation has been made, vessels are restricted to exercising
the right of ASLP through those lanes, and can only conduct innocent passage through the remaining archipelagic
waters.
Indonesia is the first and, to date, only archipelagic state to seek to designate its ASLs. Indonesia formally
submitted its ASL proposal to the 67th session of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of the IMO in May 1996. It
worked closely with the United States and Australia, representing all user states, in formulating this proposal
for three north-south ASLs through the archipelago. (footnote 4) Because key routes such as an east-west passage
were not included, Indonesia's approach was not entirely consistent with the requirement of Article 53(4) to propose
'all normal routes used for international navigation.' Nonetheless, the IMO accepted that the proposal would be
a partial designation only and that, until such time as Indonesia had designated all normal routes as ASL, the
right to ASLP would continue to apply in the remaining non-designated routes. In 1998, the IMO formally adopted
this partial system of ASL in Indonesian waters, (footnote 5) thus demonstrating its willingness to accommodate
individual cases within the apparent confines of the LOSC.
Map of Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes (green lines)
with proposed additional Sea Lanes(thin blue lines) (RAN)
Indonesia proclaimed the three north-south ASLs in Government Regulation No. 37 of 2002. Article 15 of this Regulation
states that foreign ships and aircraft may only exercise the right of ASLP through the routes designated in that
Regulation. Article 3 paragraph 2 states 'the right of archipelagic sea lane passage in other parts of Indonesian
waters can be conducted after such a sea lane has been designated in those waters for the purpose of this transit.'
(footnote 6) This implied that ships transiting through other routes would be limited to innocent passage. This
view appeared to be supported by the 'elucidation' of Regulation 37 annexed to the IMO's Safety of Navigation Circular,
which stated 'foreign ships planning to navigate [through the archipelago] may do so with the exercise of the right
of innocent passage in the Indonesian waters equally within the archipelagic sea lanes or beyond the archipelagic
sea lanes.' (footnote 7)
The implications for maritime states' merchant and military fleets caused some concern and several nations raised
the issue through diplomatic channels. During the MSC meeting in June 2003, the Indonesian delegate read from a
prepared statement confirming that the nature of the Indonesian designation was a partial one and that Indonesia
had confirmed this on repeated occasions in various IMO fora. (footnote 8) The delegate noted Indonesia's responsibility
for the safety of shipping transiting its waters and stated that much more technical and hydrographic work needed
to be done before the designation of all normal routes of passage as ASLs could be completed. However, the delegate
did refer to the 'basic problem' of identifying what constitutes a normal route.
In the international arena, Indonesia maintains that its ASL designation is only partial and accepts the right
of ASLP is available to transiting vessels that navigate through normal routes used for international navigation.
However, documents such as Regulation 37 and notices to mariners (footnote 9) take a clearly contrary view: Indonesian
law states that the only right of passage outside the three designated ASLs is that of innocent passage. This disparity
between Indonesia's international and domestic position poses a difficulty for transiting vessels.
The MSC has stated that the 'IMO shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the process of adopting archipelagic
sea lanes until such time that sea lanes including all normal passage routes have been adopted.' (footnote 10)
Where a partial designation has been adopted, the archipelagic state is obliged to periodically advise on its plans
for conducting further surveys and 'is ultimately required to propose for adoption archipelagic sea lanes including
all normal passage routes and navigational channels'. No time frame is given for this to occur.
It is in Indonesia's interests to designate all normal routes as ASLs. Once it has fully designated its ASLs, transiting
vessels will be restricted to exercising ASLP only in those ASLs, and will be limited to innocent passage through
the rest of the archipelago. Until this is completed, Indonesia will have difficulty in enforcing its domestic
law against transiting vessels.
The MSC has stated that the 'IMO shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the process of adopting archipelagic
sea lanes until such time that sea lanes including all normal passage routes have been adopted.' (footnote 10)
Where a partial designation has been adopted, the archipelagic state is obliged to periodically advise on its plans
for conducting further surveys and 'is ultimately required to propose for adoption archipelagic sea lanes including
all normal passage routes and navigational channels'. No time frame is given for this to occur.
It is in Indonesia's interests to designate all normal routes as ASLs. Once it has fully designated its ASLs, transiting
vessels will be restricted to exercising ASLP only in those ASLs, and will be limited to innocent passage through
the rest of the archipelago. Until this is completed, Indonesia will have difficulty in enforcing its domestic
law against transiting vessels.
Further work on the designation of its ASLs would reassure the user states that Indonesia is moving to resolve
the differences between its international obligations and its domestic law.
Published as Issue 6, April 2005
Notes
A. D. Supriadi, 'Does the Sea Divide or Unite Indonesians? Ethnicity and Regionalism from a Maritime Perspective',
Resource Management in Asia-Pacific, Working Paper No. 48, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian
National University, Canberra, 2003, p. 4.
R. R. Churchill, and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea - 3rd edition, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1999,
p. 123.
Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation, 1948, Article 1(a). The Organisation became
the International Maritime Organisation in 1982.
The first north-south ASL runs from the South China Sea or Singapore Strait through the Natuna Sea, Karimata Strait,
the western Java Sea and Sunda Strait; the second, from the Sulawesi and Celebes Seas through the Makassar Strait,
Flores Sea and Lombok Strait; the third through the Molucca, Ceram and Banda Seas with spurs to the Savu, Timor
and Arafura Seas.
Resolution MSC 72(69), Adoption, Designation and Substitution of Archipelagic Sea Lanes, adopted 19 May 1998.
Indonesian Government Regulation No. 37 of 2002, as annexed to IMO Memo SN/Circ.200/Add.1, 3 July 2003 (emphasis
added).
'Elucidation of Regulation Number 37', Official State Gazette of The Republic of Indonesia, No. 4210, as annexed
to IMO SN/Circ.200/Add.1, 3 July 2003.
Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Seventy-seventh Session, MSC 77/26 dated 10 June 2003, para. 28.40,
p. 128, and Annex 27.
\For example, paragraph 2 of Indonesian Notice to Mariners No 08/2003 states 'Foreign ships and airplanes which
pass through Indonesian waters must utilize the Archipelagic Sea Lanes as established.'
Resolution MSC 71(69), Adoption of Amendments to the General Provisions on Ships' Routeing, adopted 19 May 1998.
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Excerpt:
...............
Please realize that the Indonesian sea lanes of communication, the Strait of Malacca which we share with Malaysia
and Singapore, is currently used by 3,000 ships per day. I try to draw the attention of the CINCPAC and Naval Institute
in Annapolis and so on. Come to think of it, if you have an accident that blocks this Strait for, let’s say one
week, who’s going to divert the 20,000 ships waiting at the mouth of this Strait and the South China Sea and in
the Nicobar area over here? The other sea lanes of communication of most importance, of course, is the Strait of
Sunda, and in passing the very shallow dangerous Strait of Kalimantan.
The third one is off Bali. This is the widest and deepest strait that can be used by even tankers and oil carriers,
tankers the size of 400,000 tons, and so on. You pass through this Lombok Strait, you go to the Strait of Makassar
where Unocal found one of the biggest oil and gas source off shore at a depth of more than, I think, one kilometer,
which only American companies can do. And you move out to the southern part of the Philippines.
The fourth sea lane of communication, of course, is Ombai Wetar, strait north of East
Timor and our islands in the Timor area. You move to the Malaccas, you come out in the Philippines. This is the
only strait that can be used by nuclear submarines carrying ICBMs without the necessity to surface. So during the
Cold War, at the height of the Cold War, the Russian base in Camranh, which came to them in 1975 after the fall
of Saigon, and Subic Bay--the submarines used this strait and, of course, this is a source of worry to all of us
after seeing what happened to Kursk, that submarine Kursk in Russia for example.
Forty percent of the world’s shipping tonnage has to pass through Indonesia every year.
Sixty percent of the energy needs of northeast Asia has to be supplied by tankers coming from the Middle East through
the Indonesia sea lanes of communication to their side. I think this is going to accelerate in the future.
|
|
International conflict over marine resources in south-east asia: trends in politicization and Militarization
4.1
Present and future conflict over marine resources
4.2
Common threads in the pattern of conflict
4.3 Conflict
4.4
New directions for co-operation
4.5 Progressive management concepts
References
Mark J. Valencia
SINCE the late 1960s, marine awareness of nations has been enhanced by technological advances in marine use and
resource exploitation capabilities, increased expectations of benefits from potential ocean resources, and perceptions
that the 'freedom of the high seas' was advantageous to those countries with the knowledge, capital, and technology
to harvest ocean resources. This enhanced marine awareness has resulted in widespread unilateral extensions of
national jurisdiction over ocean resources out to 200 nmi or more from shore. All the coastal countries in South
East Asia have extended their maritime jurisdictions, leaving areal winners and losers, and many areas where claims
overlap. The coastal states of South-East Asia are now engaged in efforts to identify and pursue their national
development interests in the ocean arena. The superimposition of a mosaic of national policies on transnational
resources and activities multiplies the possibilities for international competition and conflict. The interest
of the developed world in the new resources gainedparticularly oil and sea lanes-may exacerbate intraregional conflicts.
Extension of jurisdiction may thus have opened a Pandora's box of continued uneven growth; volatile mixtures of
competition, nationalism, and militarization; superpower involvement; environmental degradation; and increased
technological and market dependence on the developed world
4.3 Conflict
Environmental protection can be used as a rationale for siting or resiting of sea lanes. For example, Malaysia
explained its denial of overflight of the Malacca Strait to the British Airways Concorde as a desire to prevent
the sonic boom from disturbing spawning fish (Jaafar and Valencia, 1985). Where vulnerable and valuable marine
resources coincide with pollution or the threat of pollution, specially protected areas might be established and
sea lanes consequently diverted or substituted, to the consternation of maritime powers. In the Philippines, such
areas could include the Palawan Passage route, which passes through islands containing pristine mangrove forests,
major sea turtle nesting areas, endangered crocodile species and dugong, and the Sibitu Passage, which cuts directly
through one the world's major sea turtle nesting areas as well as mangrove forests, coral reefs, and two marine
reserves.
In Indonesia, each of the major normal routes for tankers passes near valuable and vulnerable resources; for example,
the MalaccaSingapore straits route passes by areas of high (>1.000 kg/sq. km) fisecries catch, extensive mangroves,
and marine reserves; the Karimata Strait route passes by coral reefs and sea turtle nesting sites on Belitung and
extensive mangrove forests on Kalimantan; and the Java Sea portion passes through areas of high fishing intensity.
Economic Aspects
The concentration of commodity production and the long distances between the user and the sources make many of
the Asia-Pacific sea lines of communication (SLOCs) vital to the region's economies. Traffic through strategic
straits in South-East Asia could be interrupted by mines or obstacles to navigation placed within them. Sea lanes
in South-East Asia are especially important because they serve as potential choke points for a significant share
of world trade in this region. For example, much of Indonesian oil production from Sumatra is fed into refineries
and tanker ports on the Malacca Strait. If the Strait were interdicted, much of Indonesia's export earnings would
be lost, and Japan would lose 16 per cent of its oil supply and a significant share of its LNG imports. The cutoff
of oil to Japan would have a secondary economic impact on its major trading partners, including Indonesia and the
United States. Singapore's economy would be virtually shut down. Singapore, with its oil refineries and tanker
ports, serves as an outlet for some Malaysian oil exports, and thus interdiction of the Malacca Strait would severely
impact Malaysia's economy as well. As for secondary effects (Table 4 5). interdiction of sea oil movements between
Indonesia and Singapore and other ports world-wide could reduce Australia's GDP by 8.1 per cent in the third year
and Japan's GDP by about 5 per cent in the first two years with severe secondary impact for Australia (Fabric,
1983).
TABLE 4.5 - Effects of Sea-lane Blockage1,2
|
To San Francisco
|
via Malacca/ Singapore Strait
|
Outside 200-nmi Regime
|
Difference
|
|
Per Barrel Cost (US$)
|
1.13
|
1.48
|
0.35
|
|
Total Annual Costs3 (US$ million)
|
206
|
270
|
64
|
|
Non-discounted Costs 1976-2000 (US$ million)
|
5,510
|
6,750
|
1,240
|
From South-East Asia toJapan, the United States, and Europe
(For Oil from Indonesia/Singapore to the Rest of the World)4
|
Trading Partners
|
Percentage Drop in Real GDP
|
Secondary Impacts on Other Major Trading Partners
|
|
United States
|
|
0.4 (0.6)
|
0.8 (1.1)
|
1.0 (0.3)
|
|
Minimal
|
|
Japan
|
|
1.6 (4.9)
|
6.5 (4.9)
|
7.1 (2.4)
|
|
Varying-severe to minimal
|
|
Belgium
|
|
1 6 (0.7)
|
2.5 (1.4)
|
2.5 (1.3)
|
|
Minimal
|
1Assuming all trips are made in 250,000-d.w.t. tankers at 1973 charter hire rates and bunker fuel is priced at
US$70/ton.
2From D. B. Johnson and D. E. Logue (1976), 'U.S. Economic Interests in Law of the Sea Issues', in R. C. Amachen
and R.J. Sweeney (eds.), The Law of the Sea: U.S. Interests and Alternatives, Washington, DC: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Researeh.
3Assuming 2.0 million bbl/day to Atlantic and 0.5 million bbl/day to the Pacific coast.
4From R. C. Fabrie (1983), 'SLOC Security-Economic Impact', paper presented at the 1983 Pacific Symposium, Washington,
DC, National Defense University.
Even the re-routeing of maritime traffic, particularly oil tankers, can be expensive. For example, the diversion
from the Malacca to the Lombok Strait of all tankers on the Middle East-Japan route could cost importers over US$100
million per year (Das, 18 Mareh 1977: 82-3). In addition, such diversions could affect the location of ship repair,
refining, and finance industries, and could, in this specific example, seriously adversely affect Singapore's economy
and possibly benefit that of other countries bordering the new route. An alternative to re-routeing might be the
up-grading of tankers, which is equally expensive.
Strategic Considerations
A major ASEAN initiative for peace, freedom, and neutrality may be in the works, incidentally affecting the use
of the strategic straits and sea lanes for nuclear-armed submarines and aircraft (Valencia, 1985b). In 1976 ASEAN
declared its intention to make the region a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality (ZOPFAN). As a start for ZOPFAN,
an ASEAN standing committee endorsed a nuclear weaponfree zone in the area controlled by ASEAN's six members (Far
Eastern Economic Review, 27 September 1984: 13).
A nuclear-free zone in South-East Asia could in theory ban nuclear weapon-bearing US and Soviet surface vessels,
submarines, and aircraft from the strategic straits in the region. This possibility places ZOPFAN and policies
on sea-lane siting and strait access at the top of the realpolitit agenda. Even advance notice or monitoring of
such traffic would erode the strength of the US nuclear deterrent. Much to the dismay of the United States, Indonesia
temporarily closed the Sunda and Lombok straits in late September 1988 for what it said was live firing exercises.
Nuclear-armed and -powered submarines, aircraft carrying nuclear bombs, and nuclear missiles comprise the triad
of US and USSR nuclear strike capability. In order to attack or defend against a nuclear submarine, its location
must of course be known. Indeed, the United States maintains that the vulnerability of its nuclear missile-armed
submarines (the Poseidon/Trident fleet) and hence their indispensable role in a second-strike depends on their
ability to pass through straits and sea lanes submerged, un announced undetected. Four of 16 strategic straits
in the world which are important to the mobility of the US fleet to reach target areas are in South-East Asia-Malacca,
Lombok, Sunda, and Ombai-Wetar. But only the Indonesian straits of Ombai-Wetar and Lombok are physically and politically
usable by submerged submarines.
The United States currently has an advantage because the important straits states are friendly to the United States,
and because most Soviet submarines leaving port must pass through the Straits of Japan or between Iceland alla
Norway where they are detected and targeted. Effective denial of military overflight over key straits and sea lanes
would seriously impair the utility of the US strategic bombing force as a deterrent. Also, in a war between the
Soviet Union and China, the Soviet Union would have to resupply its Far Eastern front by sea through the South
East Asian region on a time-critical basis. Extension of jurisdiction over straits thus gives a small group of
straits states considerable strategic significance and the opportunity to exercise enhanced political leverage
(Valencia and Marsh, 1985: 543).
However, US deployment of naval and air forces in ocean space will not ultimately depend on the agreed or claimed
territorial sea boundaries of coastal states or on the national positions and international laws and treaties governing
passage through or over international straits. The imposition of restrictions on straits by littoral states is
apt to be a far more important impediment to surface naval mobility and the shipping of oil and other resources
than to the US underwater strategic nuclear force.
Superpower Militarization in the Marine Region
During the post-Vietnam era, the United States withdrew from the Asian land mass and consolidated its defence positions
offshore on the Pacific rim. The US forward deployment network now stretches from Japan to Clark Air Force Base
and Subic Naval Station in the Philippines, to Diego Gareia, and thence to East Africa and the Middle East. The
US Pacific Fleets (the Third and Seventh) have 87 warships, 6 carriers, 44 attack submarines, and 10 strategic
missile submarines. There has been a corresponding build-up of Soviet military power in the Pacific and Indian
oceans: the Soviet Pacific Fleet has 87 warships, I carrier, 80 attack submarines, and 30 strategic missile submarines.
In each of 1981 and 1982 an average of three Soviet warships, including nuclear-powered submarines, passed through
the Strait of Malacca to the Indian Ocean. Only one US submarine used the strait in the same period, but an average
of 7 to 8 US warships per month did so, for a total of 87 (including II carriers) compared to 42 for the USSR.
Vietnam provides the Soviet Union with a strong defence outpost to support Soviet naval operations in the Indian
Ocean. Being a forward base, Cam Ranh Bay's value to the Soviet navy lies primarily in its proximity to several
economic and political-military centres of consequence-China, Subic Bay, the ASEAN states, the Indian Ocean, and
the Malacca and Indonesian straits (Martin da Cunha, 1986). The Soviets have taken to showing the flag in the region
for political effect. A four-ship flotilla appeared in the Gulf of Thailand in November 1980, and a lone cruiser
appeared off the Singapore waterfront in February 1983. The Soviet naval presence exhibits its solidarity with
Vietnam and challenges ASEAN (Martin da Cunha, 1986). This increases the importance of military alliances to the
United States, because the US Seventh Fleet is effective between Japan and the Persian Gulf only through its network
of defence treaties and alliances in the region. Yet, the physical surveillance and protection of the sea lanes
are beyond the present capability of regional states. The United States is pressuring Japan to shoulder responsibility
for defending shipping lanes up to 1,000 nmi from Tokyo so that the United States can focus its attention on other
areas. Although ASEAN countries have increased their defence allocations, this only allows limited local patrolling.
For these reasons, the United States has been strengthening its military co-operation with the ASEAN nations, and
attempting to organize a de facto combined fleet so that the annual pan-Pacific combined exercise by the United
States, Japan, Canada, and Australia will gradually expand US military strength in the area. For example, the loss
of Subic and Clark bases in the Philippines would greatly increase the strategic value of the SouthEast Asian straits
for projection of US military power into the Gulf. China is also expanding its naval activities in the South China
Sea and beyond, and has undertaken a 'passing exercise' there with the US Navy (Intelligence, Far Eastern Economic
Review, 16 January 1986).
Figure 4.9 South-East Asia: Areas of Concern in Enforcement.
Source: Boeing Commercial Airplane Company (1982), EEZ Management and Control, November, Seat tle, ASEAN Regional
Application.
TABLE 4.6 South-East Asian Navy Fleets
|
|
SSN
|
SS CVL
|
DD
|
FF/PF
|
Escorts
|
Fast Attack
|
Patrol Craf t
|
Mine Craft
|
Landing
|
|
Brunei
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Burma
|
|
|
|
1
|
4
|
|
|
|
|
|
China'
|
2
|
102
|
12
|
16
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Indonesia
|
|
4
|
|
10
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Kampuchea
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Malaysia
|
|
|
|
2
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Philippines
|
|
|
|
7
|
10
|
|
|
|
|
|
Singapore
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Taiwan
|
|
2
|
|
23
|
10
|
|
|
|
|
|
Thailand
|
|
|
|
|
6
|
|
|
|
|
|
Vietnam
|
|
|
|
|
6
|
|
|
|
|
Kampuchea's navy consists of 40 patrol craft, all of small to moderate size and limited capabilities; most are
not operational. The Malaysian navy must maintain lines of communication between Peninsular Malaysia and Sabah/Sarawak,
prevent a foreign power from closing the Malacca Strait or interfering with shipping through it, and protect offshore
oil terminals like Pulai and its claimed and occupied islands, e.g. Terumbu Layang-Layang, in the South China Sea.
The age of its fleet, its disrepair, and the small size and light armament of most of the vessels make the Philippine
navy the least effective of the ASEAN member navies. However, the United States, with its important naval base
at Subic Bay and air base at Clark, has an equal need to keep sea lanes in the arehipelago open; thus some Philippine
navy functions are being carried out by the United States. The Singapore fleet is small but powerful for its size
and capable of keeping the sea lanes in its vieinity open.
Thailand has coastlines and claimed waters in both the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand, and therefore needs
a large patrol force to maintain adequate surveillance. Although the navy is designed primarily for patrol duties,
the fleet is numerically inadequate for its tasks. Vietnam's present active navy numbers 48 ships, but since the
country has a long coastline and claims an EEZ second only in size to Indonesia's and the Philippines', the size
of the Vietnamese navy appears inadequate to patrol its marine area effectively, let alone conduct any offensive
operations against other countries in the region. However, it is being improved with assistance from the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Union maintains a naval presence at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, and Kompong Som, Kampuchea, and air
bases at Da Nang, Vietnam, and Xieng Khoung, Laos.
Figure 4.10 shows the locations of naval and air bases in the region. Most bases are occupied by the forces of
the host nation. Most of the Indonesian navy is based at Surabaya, with additional bases at Belawan. Medan, Renai,
Tanjungpinang, and Ambon. Except for the small base at Ambon, all of eastern Indonesia is without support facilities
for its naval fleet. Similarly, the Philip pines bases most of its naval units at Langley Point, and only Zamboanga
is used to support ships operating in the southern islands. Burma, with its small fleet, has naval bases at Sittwe,
Bassein, Moulmein, and Mergui, spaced roughly evenly along the long coastline. Thailand's bases at Bangkok and
Songkhla and the partially operational Andaman Sea base at Ban Thap Lamu are poorly equipped to support the fleet.
Malaysia needs additional base facilities, since the two naval bases at Pasir Gudang and Labuan are widely separated.
China, with six bases on the South China Sea coast, has good facilities to support the hundreds of small ships
in its navy. Bases at Tsoying, Kaohsinng, and in the Peseadores are likewise adequate for the naval units of Taiwan.
Figure 4.10 South-East Asia: Naval and Air
Bases.
Source: J. R. Morgan (1983), Defence', in Morgan and Valencia, eds., Atlas for Marine Policy in Southeast Asian
Seas, P 54.
There has been an impressive array of bilateral defence exercises among ASEAN members, and although ASEAN members
have never considered the organization to be a defence alliance, there have been intermittent pressures to turn
ASEAN into a military pact. In addition to, or perhaps in response to US preferences, Singapore has called for
greater ASEAN military co-operation to meet the threat of the Soviet Union in the region (Far Eastern Economic
Review, 6 September 1984: I l) and the United Kingdom has called for increased military co-operation with ASEAN.
Further, Singapore has recently offered military facilities to the United States.
4.4 New directions for co-operation
Numerous constraints must be overcome to reduce the potential for international conflict and move toward increased
co-operation on marine resource issues in South-East Asia (Valencia, 1980: 16-38). In the wake of the successful
Indo-Chinese revolution, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China are vying for areas of influence within
the region, thus fostering instability. With the exception of Thailand, all of the countries in and around the
region have achieved independence or have experienced society-transforming movements within the past quarter century.
Many are still struggling with the basic problems of nationhood, thus bringing a nationalistic fervour into regional
affairs. Within ASEAN it self, relations are cordial but competitive and perhaps unstable in the long term. The
ASEAN countries produce many of the same raw materials, and the resulting direct competition for credit, investment
markets, and development assistance may increase with advancing economic development. South-East Asian countries
only now are beginning to perceive clearly their own national marine interests and how these differ from those
of neighbouring states or outside maritime powers. At this juncture, commonalities are neglected and differences
tend to be emphasized.
National marine resource management policies will also both influence and be influenced by maritime powers from
outside the region and by nations with adjacent jurisdictional zones. Maritime powers may choose to exploit policy
diversities by shifting activities (e.g. shipping of oil, fishing) towards areas of least resistance. Regardless
of national agreement with international treaties, legal precedents, and provisions of the UNCLOS, there will remain
problems of national and regional implementation of management designs. Marine policy in the South-East Asian seas
will be shaped by the exigencies of both national development and international relations. Policies will be largely
unilateral; occasionally bilateral where necessitated by the UNCLOS and practicality; and, rarely, multilateral.
These and related policy problems will dominate marine affairs in the region during the remainder of the twentieth
century.
What is needed is an ethic of co-operation centred on the community, implemented through participatory democracy,
and based on the common needs of self-protection and sustained development. The ZOPFAN and its implementation through
a nuclear weapon-free zone in South-East Asia would be a first critical step in the process of achieving real economic
and political freedom for the people of SouthEast Asia. An initial step in this direction could be the demilitarization
of the Spratly region and establishment of a zone of peace there. The most important application of this concept
would be the removal of critical straits, sea lanes, and air routes in the region from the naval and air, nuclear
defensive and offensive strategies of the superpowers. This in turn would remove an important plank from the superpower
realpolitik that is enveloping and threatening to consume South-East Asia.
In the case of oil, resolution or muting of boundary disputes may be a prerequisite for development of any hydrocarbon
resources in areas of unresolved boundaries, regardless of potential (Valencia, 1985). Since oil and gas discovery
and development is a common high priority among the South-East Asian nations, over lapping claims to areas with
hydrocarbon potential provide an opportunity for separating sovereignty from function by setting aside the question
of the actual boundary and providing for joint exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons in an agreed area of
overlap. Joint development could diffuse tensions between claimants and detach these disputes from the matrix of
superpower machinations. The Thai-Malaysian joint development agreement is the prime example in South-East Asia.
In the eastern Gulf of Thailand, joint development might be feasible between Vietnam and Kampuchea.
Major areas for possible co-operation in fisheres include information exchange, researeh and training, access arrangements,
surveillance and enforcement, conservation, production, processing, and marketing (Valencia and Kent, 1985). One
form of access arrangement is the single merged zone, with a single licence providing equal access to all waters.
Alternatively, there could be co-ordinated licensing arrangements, in which fishing vessels could move with relative
case from one nation's jurisdiction to another. Or transit arrangements could be liberal, with fees and royalties
paid to the country in whose jurisdiction fishing was undertaken. The nations of South-East Asia have to date shown
little receptivity to simple licensing arrangements, however, or to access by each other, preferring to engage
in joint-venture operations with outside countries.
The more ambitious ideas for regional co-operation in fisheries surveillance and enforcement contemplate jointly
operated, hight echnology schemes such as satellites or high-altitude aircraft systems, possibly combined with
a joint coast guard. As an example, in the South Pacific, vessels convicted of poaching in the fishing zone of
any member of the Nauru Agreement may be deprived of access to the waters of any other member nation. Members have
also agreed to a vessel registration system, in which only vessels registered with the Forum Fisheries Agency are
allowed to fish for tuna in any member's EEZ.
Joint fisheries production and management might be considered for shared or migratory stocks. A single corporate
structure could manage particular fisheries, with the corporation under the joint control of representatives of
several nations, perhaps operating a single regional fleet of fishing vessels. It also may be possible to undertake
co-operative efforts in processing or marketing or in some integrated combination of production, processing, and
marketing. In South-East Asia, regional joint ventures in processing might be considered for foreign markets (e.g.
tuna canning), for import-substitution in regional markets (e.g. to replace canned mackerel presently imported
from Japan), or for specialty products for local markets (e.g. fish pastes or snacks). Port infrastructure might
be created on a regional basis and to accommodate several enterprises of each member nation. The nations of South-East
Asia could also work together to increase trade in fishery products among themselves and with countries outside
the region. For example, it might be possible to create a regional marketing board that would actively promote
legal barter trade, with a central agency to serve as a clearing house (Samson, 1985).
Politically, ventures between countries in South-East Asia could be concrete manifestations of co-operation and
unity, particularly in a subregional organization such as ASEAN. They could provide cooperating nations with greater
leverage for marketing, for the acquisition of capital, and for seeking external development assistance, and they
could lead to other forms of co-operation on marine matters. Joint ventures could also eliminate or reduce the
motivations for poaching. Capital could come from regional development institutions. Regional development organizations
could more rationally allocate their funds and efforts if assistance were directed at common marine resources,
since duplication of aid on a per-country basis would be avoided. The major advantage of increasing trade with
nations outside the region would be increased foreign exchange earnings; the major advantage of increased intraregional
trade would be promotion of intraregional self-reliance and food security.
In marine conservation lie possibilities of joint development of a network of community-based reserves and of common
criteria for their designation. Trans-frontier co-operation could involve shared marine reserves, a regional task
force on marine conservation, and possibly harmonization of laws and regulations (White, 1983)
Dispute management is a marine policy issue in which countries outside the South-East Asian region also have great
interest. Mechanisms for dispute avoidance or settlement, so vital for the orderly implementation of the new ocean
regime, might be regionalized or subregionalized to conform to regional or local cultural systems.
Finally, an ASEAN (or eventually South-East Asian) Institute for Marine Resources Management (ASIMARE) (or SEASIMARE)
could be established to undertake researeh and education and training in the ASEAN (South-East Asian) region, for
ASEAN (SouthEast Asian) nations, and as far as is feasible, by ASEAN nationals. The institute should not be narrowly
and esoterically individualistic and scientific, but should focus international, interdisciplinary teams on resource
exploration, assessment, sustained development and management in support of ASEAN goals. These teams could provide
technical support to formal and informal ASEAN committees and respond to ad hoc ASEAN requests for resource management
studies. Highest priority should be on truly shared resource management problems that can only be solved by gathering
data from several countries' areas. Second priority should be given to issues held in common but not transnational
in themselves. Researeh to only one nation's benefit should be of lowest priority and on a rotating basis. The
institute would serve as a node and clearing house for requests for scientific researeh by foreign nations and
international organizations, and offers of, and requests for, technical assistance. Such researeh and technical
assistance would have to fit the institute's existing researeh agenda. The institute would also be a central data
bank, and a coordinator and implementor of human resource development for marine resource management.
Most marine science data in the region has been and is still collected and analysed by scientists of countries
external to the region; ASIMARE could be a focal point for a massive marine science knowledge and technology transfer
to the region. The need for indigenous regional co-operation is accentuated by the inadequate trained personnel
resources, facilities, and funds required to undertake major resource exploration and development programmes in
each of the ASEAN countries. ASIMARE could be a regional focal point in which knowledge and personnel would be
pooled to carry out researeh and development on problems of common interest (UN, 1982 Article 276). Since marine
resources researeh is generally costly, regional co-operation could also help ease the financial burden for each
member country. Regional co-operation in marine resource studies could also produce synoptic coverage over a longer
time period and wider area.
The researeh agenda for ASIMARE should include as overarehing themes the present and potential economic costs and
benefits of exploration and exploitation of the resources known or expected in the new jurisdictional space; the
present and projected role of marine resources in development; multinational sea use planning and management; role
of new national marine resources such as oil, minerals, and navigational space in the implementation of global
concepts such as the New International Economic Order or a Pacific Community; and identification and evaluation
of possible consortia of developed and ASEAN countries to harvest these new resources.
At present, co-operation on marine issues is incipient at best. However, political relationships change over time,
and the underlying economic potential of the marine resources of the region remains more or less as a constant-part
of the geography of the region. Under changed political conditions, an increasing share of this potential might
become available to be tapped by co-operative efforts.
6.
Conflict over natural resources in the pacific
6.1
The region and its resources
6.2
Conflicts over marine space
6.3
Conflicts over the marine environment
6.4
Conficting maritime claims
6.5
Conflicts over pelagic resources
6.6
Conflict over seabed mineral resources
6.7 Conclusions
References
James M. Anthony
THE history of the Pacific islands is in no small measure a history of conflict over natural resources. Before
foreigners came to the Pacific in seareh of whales, gold, cheap labour, sandalwood, land in the sun, noble savages,
and candidates for conversion to their religious beliefs, Pacific islanders themselves were engaged in contention
over one natural resource that was sacred and searee- land. With the arrival of foreigners, the islanders were
pitted in long and often bitter disputes with the new arrivals and sometimes among themselves.
In the wake of European rediscovery of the Pacific and its peoples, an era of unsurpassed conflict over natural
resources began. Land was at the core of these struggles. The more flagrant instances are well known-the Maoris
of New Zealand were divested of 63 million of the 66 million acres once owned by them; the Kanaks of New Caledonia
were deprived of ownership of all their lands when the French colonized them in 1853; by the early part of the
twentieth century, the Hawaiians had lost almost all of the land once held under native customary tenure; in Fiji,
shortly after that country had become a British Crown Colony in 1874 some of the best land was judged by a Land
Claims Commission appointed by the newly established British colonial government to have been 'properly alienated'
to a motley collection of itinerant foreigners. But the loss of as precious a resource as land was not the end
of the story. In time, there was conflict over other natural resources as well. In each case the natives lost,
perhaps not completely but substantially. Ownership and control of most natural resources passed into foreign hands.
The conflict over natural resources in the Pacific islands has so far largely been over those that are land based:
minerals, people, sandalwood, lumber, and fresh water. Largely ignored in the first two decades after the end of
the Second World War, the Pacific is now being 're-rediscovered'. That in itself ought not to be considered too
surprising. The Pacific, after all, is a huge body of water separating the United States from its largest trading
partners-the countries of East Asia, and Japan in particular. Moreover, it is through the Pacific that an increasing
volume of American, Soviet, and other maritime traffic, military as well as commercial, travels into East and SouthEast
Asian ports, beyond them into the Indian Ocean, and from there to the Middle East. The United States claims that
this is yet another area vital to its interests. And to lend legitimacy to that claim, the familiar spectre of
the Soviet threat to this area has also been raised. The elements to make this a new theatre of the Cold War are
present: strategic seabed mineral resources, petroleum and gas, marine space, and specks of land in a vast ocean
that must not be allowed to fall into hostile hands, domestic or foreign. It is against this background of 'strategic
denial' that the general subject of conflict over natural resources in the Pacific will be addressed.
Although it might be revealing to document, assess, and analyse the historical record of the various manifestations
of conflict over natural resources in the Pacific, that is not the purpose of this essay. The concern here is with
the 're-rediscovery' of the Pacific and its effect on the frontier resources of the ocean-fish, seabed minerals,
marine ecosystems, hydrocarbons, and marine space-in the expanded ocean areas that now fall within the jurisdiction
of island states.
Since the island states themselves are surrounded by metropolitan, industrialized states-North and South America
to the east; the Soviet Union, South Korea, Japan, China, and parts of South-East Asia to the west, and Australia
and New Zealand to the south-west-it will be necessary to examine to some extent the involvement of these metropolitan
powers (as well as others such as France and West Germany) in the present and future exploitation of Pacific marine
and related resources. In addition, it will be necessary to examine such actual and potential conflict as might
exist within and between island states over questions like disputed ocean boundaries, rates and terms of resource
exploitation, and protection of the marine environment.
Underlying the issues examined, the questions posed, and the trends identified is a narrow spectrum of complex,
interrelated, and in some ways paradoxical concerns that are of fundamental importance to the future of this vast,
now strategic region. Small in terms of population, smaller still in terms of land mass, this is a part of the
world that lies in the centreof a vast ocean that covers a third of the earth's surface. Despite their physical
location in the centre of the region, the islands have long been relegated to the periphery by some of the larger
countries around the Pacific rim. This is nowhere more clear than in the volume of material on what has come to
be known variously as the Pacific Community or the Pacific Basin Economic Community.
In the grand plans discussed in Tokyo, Washington, Canberra, and other distant capitals, the islands of the Pacific
have for a long time been taken for granted. This was illustrated by Jiro Tokuyama, Dean of the Nomura School of
Advanced Management and an adviser to the important Tokyo-based Nomura Researeh Institute, when he spoke on the
subject of 'The Emerging Pacific Community' at a closed meeting in Honolulu in October 1984. Tokuyama, in a 21-page
prepared address, had not one word to say about the Pacific islands. When questioned from the floor about this
omission, he seemed perplexed at first, but then answered that the islands could, in the emergent twenty-first
century economic order, be the playground for tired businessmen (and women) and others from the rim countries.
It might be argued that being figurative 'hewers of wood and carriers of water' in a super twenty-first century
hotel industry may not be the worst fate for Pacific islanders. What is intriguing in this scenario is the question
of whether Pacific islanders will own the hotels or whether they will be owned and controlled by the transnational
corporations that will have mined the ocean floor for minerals and reinvested the profits in a Pacific-wide island
hotel boom.
If this scenario were to be realized-and it might be-it would be a repetition of history. The resources of the
land made others rich the first time around. Now that the islanders have a rare second chance to play the resource
exploitation game again-this time with their last resources land and those of the ocean- how will the spoils be
divided? Developed nations view the South Pacific as a place to freely fish for tuna, test their weapons and, possibly,
store or dump their waste and mine the seabed minerals. The islanders are pitted again, albeit in different historical
circumstances, against those who possess technological superiority and financial power. The issues for the island
states, collectively and individually, coalesce around dcpcndence, equity, life-style and survival. These issues
kc at the heart of this struggle, and the consequences, if not approached with creativity, vision, and unusually
enlightened political and intellectual leadership, may, in the emerging world division of labour,
relegate all the inhabitants of the Pacific (barring a few local political and economic brokers) to permanent
servitude. In this respect, Pacific islanders are in a position no different from that of other resourcerich Third
World peoples. Their problems and opportunities are in microcosm the very same as those of others in the Third
World.
6.1 The region and its resources
The Pacific region contains some 10.000 islands having a total land area of 550 000 sq. km and a total population
of approximately 5 million (Table 6.1; Figure 6.1). The total area claimed by the island states as part of their
200-nmi exclusive economic zones (EEZs) is about 30 000 000 sq. km in an ocean with an area of 165 000 000 sq.
km.
The tropical islands of the Pacific are distributed both north and south of the equator roughly between 140°
W and 130° E longitude (Figure 6.1). These are islands that have long stretches of white sandy beaches, palm
trees, and summer all year long. Not all of them are low-lying coral atolls-some, such as Fiji, Vanuatu, New Caledonia,
Papua New Guinea, and the Solomons, are high islands. They are relatively rich in land-based natural resources
including minerals such as gold, copper, and manganese.
Because of their geographical location, all of these islands have two resources that are particularly important-climate
and marine space. Climatic and related conditions provide an environment that attracts increasingly large numbers
of travellers, and the islands are becoming resort areas financed by international sources of capital. This development
provides jobs for islanders, thus sustaining increasing appetites for foreign-produced goods and services. This
is part of the vicious cycle of import dependence and adverse balance of trade that characterizes the islands'
economies.
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